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Introduction
Policy-makers assign various objectives to the imple-
mentation of patient charges for public health care serv-
ices. Overall, patient charges are seen as prices for health 
care consumption and as such, they are expected to affect 
the quantities of health care demanded by the consumers 
and to generate revenues [1, 2]. Hence, patient charges 
are implemented with macro-level objectives (cost-con-
tainment and rising revenue for a sustainable health care 
system) or with meso- and micro-level objectives (effi-
cient health care utilisation, improvement of service qual-
ity and adequate reimbursement of health care providers). 
The possibility to increase providers’ income by allowing 
health care providers to charge patients directly for health 
care services provided, is also seen as a way to deal with 
informal patient payments, especially in countries where 
these payments are directly requested by providers. 
The actual ability of patient charges to achieve these 
objectives depends to a great extent on the patient pay-
ment mechanism implemented in a country, as well as on 
the health care system and context-specific factors. Evi-
dence from various low-, middle-, and high-income coun-
tries indicates what could be reasonably expected from 
the introduction of patient charges in a public health care 
sector. The aim of this paper is to review and discuss the 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
patient payment policies. The objective is to outline the 
key policy considerations.
1. Patient charges and health care demand
The implementation of patient charges in the public 
health care sector imposes prices on health care con-
sumption (incl. services and commodities). From an 
economic point of view, prices are the major determi-
nant of consumer behaviour and the quantities of a good 
demanded [3, 4]. This implies that patient charges offer 
policy-makers a tool to influence the behaviour of health 
care consumers and to manage the utilisation of health 
care services towards efficiency improvements. In fact, 
the objective of controlling health care utilisation in order 
to improve efficiency in the health care sector is broadly 
assigned to the implementation of patient charges in 
countries of all level of development [3, 5, 6]. 
There are theoretical reasons for expecting effi-
ciency improvement after the implementation of patient 
charges. It is suggested that if patients have to pay for 
health care they evaluate the expected benefits before 
the actual service use and utilise only necessary care (see 
e.g. [7–10]). Thus, economic theory predicts that patient 
charges make consumers cost-conscious and reduce the 
excess demand for health care services caused by free-
-of-charge health care provision (due to moral hazard) 
[11, 12]. It should be underlined however, that excess de-
mand does not necessarily mean demand for services that 
are medically unnecessary or potentially harmful. Indeed, 
the consumption of these additional services may have 
positive health effects. The demand is considered to be 
excessive in economic terms when the marginal costs of 
providing these additional services are greater than the 
marginal social benefits of their consumption [3, 13]. 
Empirical evidence from high-, middle- and low-
-income countries confirms that the health care utilisa-
tion actually declines after the implementation of patient 
charges (e.g. [14–24]). However, there is no convincing 
evidence that the utilisation is always reduced because 
services are unnecessary from an economic or medical 
point of view [18, 19, 25, 26]. In fact, it is reported that 
patient charges mainly reduce the utilisation of health 
care services provided to children, poor individuals and 
in areas where other costs (e.g. travelling costs) are sig-
nificantly high [6, 13, 27]. This indicates primarily ad-
verse equity effects rather than efficiency improvements.
Some authors even claim that patient charges cannot 
be an effective policy tool for controlling health care uti-
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lisation due to the potential existence of supplier-induced 
demand (discussed in [13, 28]). In the health care sec-
tor, the demand for health care services is based upon 
information acquired from the suppliers (i.e. health care 
providers) due to consumers’ insufficient medical knowl-
edge [29]. This gives the suppliers a possibility to influ-
ence the consumers’ decision to seek health care and con-
sequently, the quantity of health care demanded [1]. The 
decisions of health care providers are likely to reflect not 
only the medical needs of their patients but also their own 
preferences, and particularly, their preferences for a rea-
sonable income [29]. Whenever physicians’ income is 
related to the nature and volume of services they supply, 
physicians might have incentives to induce health care 
demand and thus, to maximise their profits. If the imple-
mentation of patient charges leads to a reduction in health 
care utilisation, this threatens the income of those provid-
ers who are paid based on service provision. Health care 
providers might try to compensate the income reduction 
by inducing consumer demand for additional or more 
expensive services [13, 26]. The suppliers’ response to 
the reduction in service utilisation caused by the intro-
duction of patient charges, can neutralise the efficiency 
improvement potential of patient charges [1, 30]. In order 
to avoid the negative effects of supplier-induce demand, 
basic strategies can be employed, e.g. remuneration of 
health care providers that is independent from the nature 
and quantity of services provided and/or strong supervi-
sion of providers’ activities [13, 26]. 
It should be recognised however, that the demand for 
health care services is not always provider-determined. 
The utilisation of some services (e.g. first contact with 
GP or visit to a specialist without a referral) is initiated 
primarily by the consumers and it derives from consum-
ers’ perceptions for the necessity of health care use in 
order to improve their health. The demand for such serv-
ices is determined mainly by the consumers’ willingness 
and ability to pay for these services and not by the sup-
pliers. Thus, the introduction of patient charges for con-
sumer-initiated health care services could appear suitable 
when considering an efficiency perspective. Moreover, 
applied simultaneously with supply-side measures for 
suppressing the supplier-induced demand, patient charges 
can be justified even for services, which utilisation is not 
determined by the consumers [13].
The potential impact of patient charges on the quan-
tity of health care demanded can be essential not only for 
decreasing the unnecessary service utilisation, but also 
for encouraging the use of particular health care serv-
ices. The assignment of this objective to patient charges 
is grounded in the fact that health care is not a monolithic 
commodity, but it comprises various commodities which 
consumption is characterised with specific private ben-
efits for the patients and externalities for the society. In 
particular, the consumption of some health care services 
results in external physical, psychological and/or finan-
cial benefits (so called externalities) to other individuals 
aside from the patients, and more generally, to the soci-
ety. Also, the private long-term benefits to the patient are 
not always fully recognised by the patient at the time of 
services consumption [4]. In this sense, different types of 
health care services should be provided to the consumer 
with different relative prices depending on their short- 
and long-term value to the patient’s health and the level 
of externalities to the society from their consumption [4, 
31]. For example, preventive and emergency services are 
associated with high (long-term) benefits to the patient’s 
health and high-level of externalities to the society. Low 
or no patient charges in case of preventive services could 
encourage the use of these services and reduce the need of 
curative services in future. On the contrary, dental servic-
es where the benefits are mainly restricted to the patient, 
could be provided with higher patient charges. The dif-
ference in the relative prices faced by the consumers can 
provide incentives in favour of more beneficial spending 
of the public resources. Thus, despite the full or partial 
coverage of some health care services, the social benefits 
can be adequately maximised. 
The idea to link patient charges to the value of health 
care services is extensively discussed at present in the 
US literature (e.g. [9, 31]). Such patient payment designs 
are known as value-based insurance designs or clinically 
sensitive cost-sharing. They presuppose the exclusion of 
specific services from patient charges, which are con-
sidered to be highly valuable for the patient and society, 
and/or exclusion of specific patient groups from patient 
charges, which are expected to benefit most from the 
health care consumption. However, the successful imple-
mentation of such designs depends on the effectiveness 
of the services targeted, the level and precision of target-
ing, the magnitude of patient fees, and patients’ respon-
siveness to prices [31]. 
The implementation of different patient charges for 
different health care services and its impact on the pattern 
of health care utilisation have not been studied properly 
yet [26, 32, 33]. However, the influence of such payment 
schemes on health care utilisation has been registered 
when there is a mixture of patient charges and free-of-
charge health care provision. As suggested by Akin et al. 
[7], on the background of patient charges, the quantities 
of preventive and maternity services, services for children 
and communicable diseases, provided free-of-charge, has 
increased. Despite the potential over-consumption, the 
free access to these services reduces the need of cure in 
the future and leads to externalities for non-users. Yet, lit-
tle is known if the increased use of this group of services 
is a result of their exclusion from patient charges [27]. 
The experience with patient charges provides another 
indication for the potential impact of patient charges on 
the pattern of service utilisation. It refers to the application 
of a cascading (sliding) fee system of patient chargers [4, 
8, 34]. The cascading system involves lower charges for 
primary health care services, higher charges for hospital 
services and highest in tertiary health care facilities. Thus, 
by graduating the price of health care services according 
to the level of health care facilities, patients can receive 
price signals, which can stimulate them to use services at 
lower levels [27]. However, the cascading system should 
be designed in a way that ensures appropriate signals to 
consumers. For example, when patients are referred from 
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primary care units to hospitals they should not pay the 
fees at both levels because this can encourage them to 
contact directly the hospital in order to avoid the first pay-
ment [8]. Moreover, evidence suggests that the cascading 
systems cannot be effective if the health care services are 
not provided at all levels with the same quality [27]. 
While the efficiency improvement potential of patient 
charges at micro-level is still being discussed, authors 
commonly agree that the decline in health care utilisation 
after the introduction of patient charges has no significant 
influence on the overall health care expenditure [35]. The 
overall health care expenditure in a country is primarily 
supply-driven while patient charges are a demand-side 
policy tool. For that reason, achieving a cost-containment 
objective through patient charges is unfeasible. As indi-
cated by the experience in high-income countries [13, 35, 
36], measures that act on the supply side of the health 
care market, appear to be more effective for contain-
ing the overall health care costs. For example, many 
European countries place the primary care providers in 
the role of ‘gate keepers’ to the specialised health care 
services and attempt to improve the utilisation pattern in 
their health care sectors. The application of supply-side 
measures together with patient charges for improving the 
efficiency in health care utilisation, has already proven to 
be effective in practice [13, 35]. 
2. Patient charges and health care system funding 
The introduction of patient charges suggests a po-
tential to generate additional revenue for the health care 
sector [28]. This characteristic of patient charges is of 
a particular interest for policy-makers in a context of 
increasing fiscal pressure and sustainability problems 
within the public health care system [5, 10, 32, 37]. Such 
a situation is reported in many low- and middle-income 
countries. In these countries, insufficient domestic re-
sources impede the improvement of the health care sector 
and the provision of health care services with adequate 
quality for the entire population. Many of these countries 
were advised in the past to implement some kind of pa-
tient charges in order to increase the resources of their 
public health care sector [38, 39, 40]. 
However, empirical evidence indicates that on an 
aggregate level, patient charges revenues do not present 
a significant contribution to the public health care fund-
ing. The gross revenues generated from patient charges 
in countries of all levels of development (including high-
-income countries) is not higher than 15% of the public 
health care expenditure with an average of 5% [14, 25, 
28]. The main reason for this is the fact that patient charg-
es need to be sufficiently low to assure that the majority 
of consumers are able to pay them while offering even 
lower or no charges for those who cannot pay or who use 
health care frequently. Otherwise, patient charges might 
discourage some consumers to seek health care services 
when necessary, resulting in adverse equity effects and 
worsen health status [41].
Even when patient charges have the potential to gen-
erate high gross revenue, the considerable administrative 
costs related to their collection at a national level, further 
decrease the yield of their implementation [42]. The ex-
perience shows that the management of patient charges 
can even absorb the revenues collected, like for example 
in some high-income countries with relatively strong 
administrative systems. If in a country, the net yield of 
patient charges tends to be null, patient charges cannot be 
considered as an effective policy tool for revenue rising 
[25]. Clearly, patient charges have relative limited poten-
tial for generating health care revenue on an aggregate 
level [8, 25, 27]. Therefore, assigning such objectives to 
patient charges tends to be unfeasible and expectations 
for additional health care revenues through patient charg-
es seem to be over-optimistic [6, 27, 41].
The ability of consumers to pay for health care and 
the administration costs related to patient charges are not 
the only factors, which influence the size of the patient 
payment revenue. There are other important determinants 
as well, such as [4, 10, 25]:
–  the type of patient payment mechanism;
–  the willingness of health care consumers to pay;
–  the market for private health care services; 
–  the possibility of obtaining additional insurance to 
cover the patient payment obligations.
These factors need to be analysed before assigning 
a revenue-generation objective to patient charges. It can 
help to avoid over-optimistic expectations from the im-
plementation of patient charges. 
A more appropriate role of patient charges in the health 
care system funding is their application as a contributory 
financing for the local health care structures [8, 25]. In 
some countries, where the public health funds have been 
slashed due to deteriorating economies, patient payment 
revenues are retained at the level of collection and are suc-
cessfully reinvested in the local health care facilities to re-
vitalise the health care provision [5, 6, 8, 43]. In particular, 
patient charges are used for covering the very small ex-
penditures of maintenance and emergency purchases (e.g. 
medical supply and devices). The collection and use of 
patient payment revenues at the point of service provision 
appears to make a major difference to the quality of health 
care services [8, 27, 44]. Evidence from different countries 
indicates that consumers are overall willing to pay some 
(usually low) fees if they receive health care services with 
good quality [4, 24, 39, 45, 46].
For this strategy to be successful, it is essential to 
have a suitable banking system and skilful local manage-
ment to assure that the revenues of patient charges are 
actually spent on urgent local priorities. Moreover, pa-
tients’ and providers’ involvement in the management of 
these revenues is required to be able to identify adequate 
priorities and their appropriate targeting [5, 8, 41]. Thus, 
in a context of health care financing crisis with a severe 
under-funding of critical inputs, the marginal net revenue 
from patient charges that are retained locally, may offer 
greater benefits than those suggested by the low mon-
etary figures at a national level [6, 25, 32]. 
Another issue related to patient charges and health 
care system funding, is the existence of informal patient 
payments in a country. The existence of these payments 
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is often a response to the insufficient financial resources 
and poor access to basic health care services. The presence 
of informal patient payments is an important feature of 
the health care systems in many middle- and low-income 
countries [47, 48] but informal patient payments are re-
ported in high-income countries as well [49]. Empirical 
evidence shows that the informal payments in some coun-
tries can represent a significant part of the income of the 
health care providers. Informal payments are paid to health 
care providers both in the hospitals and in out-patient 
policlinics. These payments can take either monetary or 
non-monetary form [48, 50, 51]. The existence of informal 
patient payments can have an adverse effect on equity and 
efficiency in the health care system, and can hinder the es-
timation of future funding requirements of the health care 
sector. Moreover, these types of payments can introduce 
undesirable incentives for health care providers [48,52], 
such as provision of health care based on the ability to 
pay rather than health care needs and cost-effectiveness of 
care. Therefore, they should be eliminated.
From a theoretical point of view, the implementa-
tion of patient charges can be seen as an opportunity to 
convert the informal patient payments into formal health 
care charges. However, the development of an appro-
priate patient payment policy aimed at dealing with the 
informal patient payments requires reliable data on the 
magnitude and pattern of these payments, as well as on 
the willingness and ability of consumers to make such 
payments. This is also a necessary precondition to avoid 
the potential adverse effect of the implementation of 
patient charges in a context of informal payments. Evi-
dence suggests that the introduction of patient charges 
can result in a mix of formal and informal charges, which 
increases the real out-of-pocket spending of the consum-
ers [13, 48]. 
Thus, inequities in health care financing created by 
informal patient payments in case of officially free-of-
charge health care provision can deteriorate after the 
introduction of formal charges [13]. Furthermore, if pa-
tient charges are perceived as a mechanism for replacing 
the informal payments, the local management of patient 
charges revenue aimed at adequate supply and provider 
remuneration is important [47, 48]. Some authors even 
suggest that the possibility to shift the flow of financial 
resources from the informal part of the health care sec-
tor to an official mechanism for pooling resources (such 
as patient payment mechanism), should be considered 
from a broader perspective. A general financial reform in 
a country accompanied by in-depth health care reforms 
might be more effective in dealing with informal patient 
payment rather than the introduction of official patient 
charges [43]. 
3.  Equity consideration for the implementation of patient 
charges
Although, the literature provides diverse conclusions 
about the rationale of implementing patient charges for 
efficiency and sustainability improvements in the health 
care sector, there is nearly a common agreement about 
the potential adverse effects of these payments on equity 
[4]. This is because by definition patient charges contra-
dict the equity concepts. In general, equity in the health 
care sector means paying according to the ability and 
receiving according to the needs, while patient charges 
imply contributions based on the health status and access 
determined by the income [54]. Thus, the introduction 
of patient charges for health care services is associated 
with both inequity in health care financing and inequity 
in health care access.
Patient charges for public health care services cause 
inequity in health care financing, since their magnitude 
is not necessarily related to the consumers’ ability to pay. 
Individuals from the same income group are charged dif-
ferently if they have different health care needs. At the 
same time, individuals from different income groups can 
be required to pay the same amounts if they happen to 
need the same services. In this sense, patient charges can-
not assure proportionally equal payments for health care 
from all income groups [13, 32, 55].
Because patient charges do not require a distinction 
between high- and low-income individuals, and because 
the low-income individuals are likely to be more price-
sensitive, it is suggested that the introduction of patient 
charges causes a higher financial burden for low-incom-
ers than for the wealthier [6, 13, 45]. Thus, the reduction 
in the quantity of health care demanded after the intro-
duction of patient charges can be greater for the poor than 
for the richer. The wealthier patients can afford to pay 
more without significantly reducing their necessary (and 
even unnecessary) demand [21, 32, 56]. For that reason, 
patient charges are described (e.g. [54, 55]) as a highly 
regressive policy tool. 
Even when all income groups are equally price-
-sensitive, as suggested by some studies (see [18, 19, 
26]), patient charges are regressive because the poor need 
to spend a larger part of their income for health care than 
the richer. In some cases, it could be that the spending 
of the poor for health care services reaches the limits of 
their incomes, which means that patient charges could 
result in a great welfare loss for the poor. Therefore, 
some authors (e.g. [55, 57]) suggest that the basic eq-
uity effect of introducing patient charges is shifting the 
health care costs from those paying premiums/taxes to 
those who have fallen sick. In this sense, patient charges 
present a kind of “taxation” on the illness from those who 
are already in the disadvantaged position of being sick. 
A policy that results in taxation of disadvantaged people 
would be undesirable for social and ethical reasons [58]. 
From a theoretical point of view, equity in health care 
financing can only be ensured if patient charges are re-
lated to patient income [59]. Introducing price discrimi-
nation among the health care consumers is of course not 
unproblematic. Patients have to be classified into income 
groups and differentiated prices for different services 
should be calculated [56]. If such patient payment mecha-
nism can be developed, its successful implementation will 
be determined to a great extent by the financing and man-
agement capacity of the particular health care system [38]. 
The potential of price discrimination may be even lower 
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if the wealthier patients can opt for purchasing health care 
services at the private sector [56]. A more appropriate sys-
tem of price discrimination can be to set fees for differ-
ent services and then to adjust these fees based on patient 
income during the service provision. For example, it is 
possible to have a low-enough uniform fee for a consulta-
tion and then to introduce a price discrimination during 
the treatment. This way neither the poor nor the wealthier 
patients will be discouraged to purchase a consultation 
at public health care facilities [56]. In any case, a patient 
payment mechanism based on price discrimination will be 
characterised with high administration costs and complex-
ity. It is likely that the administration costs of such mecha-
nisms considerably wave its benefits. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that patient payment mechanisms based on 
price discrimination remain primarily theoretical models. 
Patient charges can also cause inequity in access to 
health care services since the opportunity to benefit from 
health care when there are patient charges is not neces-
sarily distributed according to the needs. Patient charges 
create financial barriers most often for people who need 
health care frequently [13]. The very poor people for 
example often fall in this group due to the reverse re-
lation between poverty and poor health status [60]. The 
introduction of patient charges can deeper this revers-
ible effect by reducing the access of poor individuals to 
health care services [26, 60]. Even for individuals who 
do not fall in the group of poor people, patient charges 
can present a financial barrier to service utilisation if the 
intensity of use is high. This could be the case of the eld-
erly, children, and chronically sick who belong to mid-
dle-income households, but who often need health care 
services. For these population groups, the accumulation 
of patient charges can become a financial burden. For 
both poor and intensive users, patient charges can cause 
delays in seeking necessary treatment and worsen health 
status. This situation is observed in low-, middle- and 
high-income countries (e.g. [3, 35, 58, 61]). 
Yet, the experience with free-of-charge health care 
provision suggests that the absence of patient charges 
does not necessarily ensure equal access to medical care 
for all population groups especially if the health care 
resources are insufficient (see [6, 62, 63]). When health 
care is free at the point of consumption, other factors than 
patient charges replace the rationing of service utilisa-
tion. The travel costs, for example, can represent an im-
portant financial barrier for using otherwise free health 
care services. The services provided free-of-charge at the 
point of consumption are often inequitably distributed 
and concentrated mainly in the urban areas close to the 
middle- and high-income population groups (see [61, 
64]). When the travel distances are long and the transport 
costly, the unequal geographical distribution of the health 
care services makes access of low-income groups and ru-
ral population rather expensive and time consuming [65]. 
Moreover, even if there is no financial or timing barrier 
for using health care services, the behaviour of health 
care providers can have inequitable consequences. Phy-
sicians might have (or find) the possibility to decide 
themselves to whom from the waiting patients to provide 
the free-of-charge services, which can affect the equity 
in access. When there is no control over the physicians’ 
decisions, the amount of health care services provided 
according to factors other than the needs of the patients 
may be increased. The existence of informal patient pay-
ments in a country might be an additional argument why 
officially free-of-charge health care provision does not 
always assure equity. 
It should be underlined however, that inequities 
cased by patient charges are much greater than in case 
of free-of-charge health care provision. In addition to the 
costs of travelling and waiting, vulnerable low-income 
and rural population groups should bare also the patient 
charges. The potential distortion of equity in the health 
care sector due to the implementation of patient charges 
is the soundest reason for the objection of patient charges 
as a policy tool [4]. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the need to remove patient charges in low-income coun-
tries has come into focus of current policy debates and 
empirical research [6, 32, 66–68]. It is recognised how-
ever, that the removal of these payments cannot be done 
instantaneously and should be accompanied with policy 
measures to avoid deterioration in health care provision 
due to reduced service funding [55].
The inequity in health care provision caused by pa-
tient charges can be reduced to a certain extent by ex-
empting the poor from such payments and introducing 
modest patient payment obligations for the low-income 
groups [41, 65]. However, other vulnerable population 
groups who are frequently in need of health care services 
(e.g. children, elderly and chronically sick) need to be 
considered for exclusion or fee reductions as well [3, 13, 
61, 58]. 
Despite the intentions of policy-makers to accompany 
the introduction of patient charges with equity protection 
measures, the adverse equity effects are still observed 
[4,69]. There are two main reasons for this: inadequate 
design of the equity protection measures and/or inability 
to implement them in practice. For example, in a review 
of exemption mechanisms that accompanied patient 
charges in low-income countries, Barnum and Kutzin 
[34] report that these mechanisms frequently have an 
inequitable nature, notably for civil servants and mem-
bers of the armed forces, who are not necessarily unable 
to pay or in need of frequent health care use. Thus, the 
exemption arrangements do not always reflect the con-
sumer ability to pay but are also based on other general 
considerations [70]. 
Even when the exemption mechanism designed by 
policy-makers provides a base for ensuring equity and 
improving the access of the poor to health care, its im-
plementation often fails in practice [6, 71]. In some 
low-income countries for example, the calculation of the 
incomes is administratively difficult due to absence of 
reliable data about the real economic status and existence 
of income-subsistence activities [4, 38]. As result, the 
poor population groups cannot be accurately identified, 
which leads to inequity even though an exemption mech-
anism is in place. Additionally, the failure of the exemp-
tion mechanism can be caused by a lack of appropriate 
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dissemination of information about its existence, provid-
ers’ reluctance to grant the exemption and/or the social 
stigma associated with the exemptions [4, 60, 70, 72]. 
Conclusion
This paper presented a review of theoretical and 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of patient pay-
ment policies with the objective to discuss the key policy 
considerations. The experience of countries at different 
levels of development (low-, middle-, and high-income 
countries) was taken into account to outline what could 
be reasonably expected from the introduction of patient 
charges for public health care services. 
The review suggests that the social benefits of intro-
ducing patient charges in the public health care sector are 
still rather uncertain (mostly due to a lack of systematic 
empirical research), while their adverse effects on equity 
are well recognised. Overall, patient charges could be, to 
a certain extent, a successful policy tool for shaping the 
pattern of health care utilisation towards micro-efficiency 
improvements, and for improving the quality of health 
care provision by managing the fee revenues at a local 
level. However, an additional condition for success is the 
appropriateness of the design of patient charges with re-
spect to equity in the public health care sector. 
Nevertheless, an increased reliance on patient charges 
is unlikely to improve macro-level efficiency and sustain-
ability in the health care sector but will rather have ad-
verse equity effects on health care provision especially 
in a context of informal payments. It remains the gov-
ernment’s responsibility to deal with the existence of 
informal patient payments (where applicable), to secure 
adequate resources and investments for the public health 
care sector, and to contain the overall health care costs 
using supply-side measures rather than solely patient 
charges. 
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Abstract:
Policy-makers assign various objectives to the implementation of pa-
tient charges for public health care services. These charges impose 
prices on health care consumption and as such, they are expected to 
affect the quantities of health care service demanded, and to gener-
ate revenues. The actual ability of patient charges to achieve these ob-
jectives depends to a great extent on the patient payment mechanism 
implemented in a country, as well as on the health care system and 
context-specific factors. This paper reviews and discusses the theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of patient payment poli-
cies. The paper suggests that patient charges can be a successful policy 
tool for controlling the pattern of health care utilisation and improving 
the quality of health care provision. However, an additional condition for 
success is the appropriateness of the design of patient charges with re-
spect to efficiency and equity in the public health care sector.
Streszczenie:
Dopłaty pacjentów jako skuteczne narzędzie polityki 
zdrowotnej. Teoretyczne założenia i empiryczne dowody
Słowa kluczowe: dopłaty pacjentów, polityka zdrowotna, 
efektywność, sprawiedliwość
Wprowadzeniu dopłat pacjentów do publicznych świadczeń opieki zdro-
wotnej towarzyszą różnorodne cele. Dopłaty te, stanowiąc cenę konsu-
mowanych świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej, mają wpływać na ich liczbę 
i/lub generować dodatkowe przychody. Możliwość osiągnięcia tych ce-
lów zależy w dużej mierze od mechanizmu dopłat pacjentów wprowa-
dzonego w danym kraju, jak również od cech systemu opieki zdrowotnej 
oraz czynników pozasystemowych. Niniejszy artykuł prezentuje i pod-
daje pod dyskusję teoretyczne założenia i empiryczne dowody na sku-
teczność polityki dopłat pacjentów. Przedstawione wyniki wskazują, że 
dopłaty pacjentów mogą być skutecznym narzędziem kontroli struktury 
korzystania ze świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej, jak również polepszenia ja-
kości dostarczanej opieki zdrowotnej. Jednakże dodatkowym warunkiem 
osiągnięcia sukcesu jest odpowiednia konstrukcja systemu dopłat, za-
pewniająca efektywność i sprawiedliwość w publicznym systemie opie-
ki zdrowotnej. 
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